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Abstract 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the relationship of Big 4 auditor and auditor switch towards earnings 
manipulation. This study employed a sample of 1002 firm-year data from Bursa Malaysia over the period from 2010 to 2012. 
Using Modified Jones Model with ROA (Kathori et al., 2005), the result shows that Big 4 auditor significantly reduces the 
occurrence of earnings manipulation. The result also found that switching from non-Big 4 to Big 4 audit firm shows the 
significant positive impact towards earnings manipulation. This indicates that auditor switch from non-Big 4 to Big 4 auditor 
does not reduce earnings manipulation activities. This study however, provide contradictory result using the Modified Jones 
Model as proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) which shows no significant impact between Big 4 auditor and auditor switch toward 
earnings manipulation. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial reports are viewed by all stakeholders such as investors, creditors, customers, and others, as a mirror of 
the firm’s performance (Hassan & Ahmed, 2012). However, the occurrence of agency problems due to the conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders could motivate the misrepresentation of firm performance. Earnings 
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manipulation is accomplished by changing the company’s underlying economy performance which is likely to 
impact shareholders’ wealth (Hassan & Ahmed, 2012; Gunny 2005). Earnings manipulation may negatively impact 
firm’s future performance as the manager is willing to sacrifice upcoming cash flows to increase current period 
income (Chih et al., 2008). Involved earnings manipulation, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may moderate 
confidence and assurance in the financial information system. 
As a consequence, high audit quality is desired by most of the corporations to reduce the possibility of audit 
failure by the auditor which provide independent judgment and valuation of financial reports. The high audit quality 
is expected to be derived from the Big 4 auditors because large auditors have more inducements to identify any 
possibility of audit failure and positively contribute to credibility offered by auditor because they want to maintain 
their honorable reputation, thus guarantees high quality of audit (Lee & Lee, 2013; Zakaria & Daud, 2013). In 
Malaysia, Ishak, Mansor & Sutan Maruhun (2013) point out that the Big 4 audit firms consistently dominate 72% of 
the audit market share in year 2003 where the clients are commonly in the average audit fee, lesser revenue and in 
medium total assets categories. Moreover, the high audit quality is expected to provide independent auditing 
function which possibly detect or unveil earnings manipulation and other misconducts committed by managers or the 
controlling shareholders (Lin & Liu, 2010). Therefore, the management is likely to influence auditor’s decision and 
have an incentive to switch auditor with the intention to pursue their own interest. 
In Malaysia, the concern of auditor switch is not clearly addressed in any statute, neither the Securities 
Commissions Act 1985 nor the Companies Act 1965 (Syed Mustapha Nazri et al., 2012; Abdul Nasser et al., 2006). 
The reason of auditors change from resignation or dismissal by the client also become public question since it is not 
publicly available (Syed Mustapha Nazri et al., 2012). Auditor switch is desired as to increase auditor independence 
and promote audit quality because it allows client firms to find more experienced and reputable auditors (Mostafa 
Mohamed & Habib, 2013; Kim & Yi, 2009; Fargher, Lee & Mande, 2008; Firth et al., 2012). However, other studies 
argued that auditor switch is more likely to occur in the financially distressed firms (Abdul Nasser et al., 2006). 
Thus, there are diverse results on the impact of auditor switch toward the firm’s economic performance. Hence, this 
study attempts to reconfirm the existing studies by examining the relationship of the two important auditing 
characteristics; Big 4 auditor and auditor switch towards earnings manipulation. 
Although numerous studies were conducted on the impact of Big 4 auditor and auditor switch on the earnings 
manipulation in emerging market, the empirical evidence for Malaysian setting are limited. Thus, this study aims to 
extend the existing literature by concentrating on the relationship between Big 4 auditor and auditor switch towards 
earnings manipulation. Moreover, the findings of this study will provide a significant contribution to public listed 
companies’ users such as investors, management team, public, financial institution and other stakeholders. The 
findings will provide information pertaining to the incentives and elements that contribute to the earnings 
manipulation occurrence. 
2. Literature Review 
In general, agency relationship exists when one or more individuals which are principal (shareholders) employ 
another person, which is agent (management), to perform some services on behalf of the principal and delegates 
decision making power to the agent (Jensen & Smith, 1985; Sun & Sun, 2007). However, agent and principal have 
different interests which initiate to agency problems (Sun & Sun, 2007). Dissimilarity of interest between agent and 
principal motivate conflicts between them. Definitely, this agency conflicts which are caused by the information 
asymmetry between manager and shareholders offer an opportunity to earnings manipulation.  
The term of earnings manipulation covers a wide variety of legitimate and illegitimate actions by management 
that affects an entity’s earnings. Chih, Shen & Kang (2008) defined earning management as the application of 
insiders’ discretion in financial reporting in order to overstate the true amount of earnings and understate any actual 
earning losses or decreases. In contrast, Rahman et al. (2013) proposed earnings manipulation as reasonable and 
legal management decision making in financial reporting intended to reach stable and expectable financial results. 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) suggest that earnings manipulation happens when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholder about the 
underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
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accounting numbers. Therefore, auditors may act as the external governance mechanisms that reduce agency 
problems by constraining earnings manipulation practices.  
In Malaysia, the market for audit services for public listed companies is conquered by the international Big 4 
audit firms (Che Ahmad, Houghton & Mohamad Yusof, 2006). Prior studies have provided evidences that Big 4 
auditors could produce higher audit quality than non-Big 4 auditors which effectively reduce discretionary accruals 
in public firms (DeAngelo, 1981; Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo & Subramaniam, 1998; and Krishnan 2003). 
Consistently, Bauwhede et al. (2003) report the audit-quality differentiation between Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors 
when they are dealing with income-decreasing earnings manipulation. These results provide underlying rational that 
large auditors (Big 6) are more competent and provide higher quality service rather than smaller auditors (non-Big 
6). However, Ishak, Haron, Nik Salleh & Abdul Rashid (2011) found that auditor types which are Big 4 and non-Big 
4 auditors do not affect the discretionary accruals. Furthermore, Bauwhede (2003) do not find any proof of audit-
quality differentiation between Big 6 audit firm and non-Big 6 audit firm through income-increasing earning 
manipulation as well, not even in the public listed companies. 
Since auditors play significant role in detecting any mismanagement done by the manager, there are possibilities 
of the occurrence of arguments between the auditor and manager because of different ideas and views. Therefore, 
manager may switch the present auditor to get more favorable auditor (Davidson, Jiraporn & DaDalt, 2006). 
Conceptually, auditor switch can occur in different forms such as switching to a larger auditor or switching to a 
smaller auditor (Lin & Liu, 2010). In a study by Lin & Liu (2010), they found that the firms with weak internal 
control would be more likely to switch to smaller auditors instead of larger auditor to avoid effective audit 
monitoring by larger auditor. Consistent with Davidson et al. (2006), this study also stated that firms that switch 
auditor from big 4 auditor to non-Big 4 auditor and previously received a modified opinion show higher earnings 
manipulation than companies with qualified opinion. Therefore, in case of auditor switch from smaller auditor to 
larger auditor, the audit quality should improve and possibly reduce earnings manipulation or tunneling behaviors 
(Lin & Liu, 2010). 
In a developing country like Malaysia, the concern of auditor switch is not clearly addressed in any statute, 
neither the Securities Commissions Act 1985 nor the Companies Act 1965 (Syed Mustapha Nazri et al., 2012; 
Abdul Nasser, Abdul Wahid, Syed Mustapha Nazri & Hudaib, 2006). The reasons and initiation of auditor change in 
Malaysia are not informative because this information is not publicly available as it is not disclosed in the annual 
report even the information is documented in written representations (Syed Mustapha Nazri et al., 2012). 
Consistently, in a recent study, Hossain, Mitra, Rezaee (2014) found that the companies are significantly less likely 
to reveal the causes for their auditor switches if the switches are accompanied by red-flag issues regarding 
management’s integrity and financial reporting quality. 
3. Research Design 
The study analyzed whether the occurrence of earnings manipulations is associated with Big 4 auditor and 
auditor switch in 334 Malaysian Public Listed Companies for three years, from 2010 until 2012. This study has 
taken seven industries listed in Bursa Malaysia consisting of construction, customer product, industrial product, 
trading and service, property, plantation and mining and technology for the three-year observation. However, this 
study excludes the investment, finance, trust and funds companies due to the different regulatory requirement. The 
data were collected from annual reports and the Data Stream Thompson Reuters version 17 (Terminal Based). The 
dependent variable of this study is earnings manipulation and the independent variables comprise of Big 4 auditor 
and auditor switch. The control variables are firm size, performance, industry and leverage.  
The following equation model is employed to test the effect of Big 4 auditor and auditor switch on earnings 
manipulation: 
DACC іt= β΋+ βΌ (BIG4) it + β΍(ASWITCH) it + βΎ (SIZE) it + βΏ(ROA)it + 
β5 (CONSTR) it + β6(CONSPROD)it + β7(INDSPROD) it + β8(TRDGSER) it 
+ β9(PROPERTY) it + β10(PLANT) it + β11(TECH) it+ β12(LEV) it + ε it 
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Where DACC is a Discretionary accrual (earnings manipulation), BIG4 is a Big 4 auditor, ASWITCH is an 
auditor switch, SIZE is a log of market value of equity, ROA is a Return on Assets, CONSTR is a construction 
industry, CONSPROD is a consumer product industry, INDSPROD is a industrial product industry, TRDGSER is a 
trading and services industry, PROPERTY is a property industry, PLANT is a plantation and mining industry, 
TECH is a technology industry and LEV is a leverage. 
4. Findings and Discussion 
Fig. 1 represents the regression results of the relationship between the discretionary accruals determined by 
Modified Jones model and Modified Jones Model with ROA with the independent variables comprises of Big 4 
auditor and auditor switch. The independent variables have contributed 18.60% to the variance of dependent 
variable for Modified Jones Model with ROA and only 8.10% for Modified Jones model. Even though the adjusted 
R- Square for Modified Jones model is not as high as Modified Jones Model with ROA, but the figure of 8.10% is 
still acceptable, since 1% of adjusted R square found by Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) is 
also acceptable. 
This study hypothesized that there is a significant relationship between Big 4 auditor and earnings manipulation. 
The result that used Modified Jones Model with ROA in measuring discretionary accruals has supported the first 
hypothesis. The result clearly shows that there is a negative significant impact of Big 4 auditor towards earnings 
manipulation. On the other hand, Modified Jones Model failed to find any significant relationship between Big 4 
auditor and earnings manipulation. Thus, it can be concluded that this first hypothesis is accepted for Modified 
Jones Model with ROA, but rejected for Modified Jones Model. 
This study also hypothesized that there is a significant relationship between auditor switch and earnings 
manipulation. The result that used Modified Jones Model with ROA has supported the second hypothesis. However, 
the result is contradicting if discretionary accrual is measured using Modified Jones Model which shows that there is 
no significant relationship between auditor switch and earnings manipulation. Thus, this hypothesis is accepted but 
only under Modified Jones Model with ROA and not Modified Jones Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Multiple Regression Analysis 
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Notes: *, ** and *** symbolizes statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. DACC is normal score of discretionary 
accruals calculated using Van der Waerden formula. DACC is measured using Modified Jones Model with ROA as recommended by Kothari et 
al. (2005). BIG4 is dummy variable equal to 1 if firm audited by Big 4 auditor and 0 if firm audited by non-Big4 auditor. (A) NON BIG4 – BIG4 
is dummy variable equal to 1 if firm switch auditor from non-Big 4 to Big 4 auditor; 0 otherwise. (B) BIG4 – NON BIG4 is dummy variable 
equal to 1 if firm switch auditor from Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditor; 0 otherwise. (C) BIG4 - BIG4 is dummy variable equal to 1 if firm switch 
auditor from Big 4 to Big 4 auditor; 0 otherwise. (D) NON BIG4 – NON BIG4 is dummy variable equal to 1 if firm switch auditor from non-Big 
4 to non-Big 4 auditor; 0 otherwise. (E) NONE is dummy variable equal to 1 if firm not switch auditor; 0 otherwise. SIZE is natural logarithm of 
market capitalization. ROA is normal score of return on assets using Van der Waerden formula. LEV is leverage calculated by divide total debt 
with total assets. CONSTR is dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is construction firm; 0 otherwise. CONSPROD is dummy variable equal to 1 if 
firm is consumer product firm; 0 otherwise. INDPROD is dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is industrial product firm; 0 otherwise. TRDGSER is 
dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is trading. 
5. Conclusion 
The highlight of external audit function in the revised Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, 2012 conform 
the important roles of auditing in strengthening the governance structures to mitigate the earnings manipulation 
activities. Hence, this study aims to examine whether the audit quality provided by Big 4 auditors were significant to 
earnings manipulation practices. By using Modified Jones Model with ROA, our findings suggest that the there is a 
significant relationship between Big 4 auditor and earnings manipulation. This result is supported by Chia, Lapsley 
& Lee (2007) and Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam (1998) which found that Big 6 audit firms 
significantly reduce earnings manipulation activities. Contrarily, the result is contradicted to the Modified Jones 
Model where there is no significant relationship between Big 4 auditor and earnings manipulation. This result is 
consistent with Ishak, Nor Haron, Nik Salleh & Abdul Rashid (2011) which found that Big 4 auditor do not affect 
the discretionary accruals. 
Meanwhile, the study has discovered that there is a significant relationship between auditor switch and earnings 
manipulation using Modified Jones Model with ROA. These findings are consistent with a study done by Davidson 
et al. (2006) which documented high earnings manipulation if firm switch their auditor. However, the result using 
Modified Jones Model shows that there is no significant relationship between all five categories of auditor switch 
and earnings manipulation. This study is subjected to several limitations such as insufficient sample data and limited 
application of accrual model. Thus, in order to get more robust results, future research is hoped to increase the 
number of sample data and employ a different model in measuring discretionary accruals. 
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